No bullshit. No obligation. An enquiry doesn't reserve a place.
The internet has had an absolute shocker. Running a café, orchard or workshop doesn't leave much time to follow
security alerts. Start with three things your website provider should be able to demonstrate: what's running,
whether it was exposed, and whether you can recover. Your website might be fine. Let's establish what we can
actually verify.
November: what needs checking now?
Reviewed 13 November 2026. Hosting, trusted applications and backups: check what applies to your business.
Incident and disclosure dates are shown separately from this review.
MICROSOFT DISCLOSURE AND CISA LISTING · 10 NOVEMBER UTC
Outlook on Windows: confirm the security update landed.
Microsoft published fixes for Outlook spoofing flaw CVE-2026-124194, and CISA added it to its known-exploited
catalogue. Microsoft's affected-product list includes Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise and Office LTSC
2021/2024 on Windows. This is a targeted update check, not evidence your mailbox or business has been
compromised.
Useful action: ask whoever manages your computers to apply the relevant November
Office security update and verify the installed build for your servicing channel. If updates are centrally managed,
ask for confirmation across staff computers, not just one machine. Treat unexpected files cautiously while the update
is being arranged.
OpenSSH released a critical fix for a password-login bypass affecting particular Linux configurations. Alpine
says affected servers can admit an attacker without the account's password. This requires a running SSH
service and specific authentication/account settings; it does not affect every Linux server or ordinary
container.
Useful action: ask your host whether it runs Alpine with SSH and whether the
advisory applies. If it does, ask them to install the vendor's fixed package and restart the SSH service, then verify
it. Installing the package alone leaves the old service running. Have the provider preserve working administrative
access while making changes.
Exploitation update, 9 November: CISA added this flaw, now identified as CVE-2026-123158,
to its known-exploited catalogue. That strengthens the reason to check affected servers promptly; it is new exploitation
evidence about the 5 November disclosure, not a new flaw or proof your server was attacked. CISA's official catalogue.
OBSERVED FROM 1 NOVEMBER · REPORTED 3 NOVEMBER, UPDATED 4 NOVEMBER
Microsoft 365: who else has the keys?
Todyl reports stolen application credentials being used to access Microsoft 365 and Azure, including IT
providers' customer environments. This is credential abuse, not a newly discovered Microsoft software flaw.
Useful action: if an IT provider manages your email or cloud files, ask them
to review trusted applications, delegated access and application sign-in logs, and investigate unexpected access.
Keep MFA enabled for people; it doesn't cover every application identity. Ask who will contain affected access and
replace exposed credentials if evidence is found.
OPSSHIELD says attackers compromised its infrastructure and distributed a malicious cPGuard update on 2
November. This is hosting security software: your provider may run it even if you've never heard of it.
Useful action: ask whether your server received the affected update. The vendor
calls for cPGuard 5.88.25 or later and, where the malicious script ran or may have run, treatment as a compromise
and replacement of affected passwords and keys. Cleanup does not undo stolen credentials. Ask for the host's evidence
and recovery plan; don't try server-repair commands yourself.
CISA added WordPress Core CVE-2026-119977 to its known-exploited catalogue on 3 November. The flaw can allow
code execution during a core upgrade. WordPress released the security fix in 7.1.4 on 28 October; the November listing isn't a new disclosure or proof that your site was attacked.
Useful action: ask your provider to confirm that the relevant core security update
actually completed, alongside plugin, theme and PHP updates. Check any earlier exposure and relevant logs. “Automatic
updates are switched on” is not confirmation that an update succeeded.
If you still need the fix: Xint's 3 November research shows that the old updater
can remain vulnerable during the first full-package upgrade. Ask your host to protect the temporary upgrade directory
from public web access before that update, using a supported process. Don't indefinitely postpone patching. This
is added update guidance, not a new November vulnerability. Xint's research and update guidance.
Taking bookings with LatePoint? A separate flaw, CVE-2026-118066, was disclosed
on 6 November UTC. Versions through 5.7.6 can allow customer-account takeover, exposing bookings and personal information.
Ask your provider to update the plugin to the current supported release (5.7.8 at this review) and check unexplained
customer-password resets or account changes. The fix shipped in 5.7.7 on 2 November. This is customer-account risk,
not a claim that every WordPress administrator account is vulnerable or that your site was attacked. Wordfence's CVE record · LatePoint release history.
Accepting files through Ninja Forms? The premium File Uploads add-on, not Ninja
Forms core generally, has a file-deletion flaw disclosed on 11 November (CVE-2026-126537). If you use this add-on,
ask your provider to check its version and update 3.3.36 or earlier to 3.3.37 or later. If patching is delayed,
agree how to disable the affected upload function without losing essential enquiries. Investigate unexplained missing
files; an update won't restore deleted data. Wordfence's CVE record · Affected and fixed versions.
Apache HTTP Server, security release 11 November. Apache rates CVE-2026-119618
critical: its HTTP/2 module can suffer memory corruption leading to code execution. Versions 2.4.55–2.4.70 are affected;
2.4.71 contains the fix. Ask your host whether the affected module is in use and whether 2.4.71 or a vendor-confirmed
backport is running. A public website supporting HTTP/2 doesn't by itself establish that its backend is affected.
This is a vulnerability disclosure, not evidence your site was compromised. Apache's official security advisory.
Linux kernel, AWS bulletin dated 30 October and updated 5 November. CVE-2026-98432
affects how some network traffic is handled. AWS reports demonstrated remote code execution under specific conditions,
but no evidence of malicious exploitation. Ask your host to check the running kernel against its distribution's advisory
and confirm that any required reboot has happened. Installing a kernel package alone may leave the vulnerable kernel
running. AWS's service-specific guidance.
Ubuntu's APT updater, disclosed 4 November. CVE-2026-109518 can let an attacker
manipulating package downloads substitute software during installation. Canonical has released fixes and recommends
temporarily disabling download retries while applying them. Ask your provider to verify the installed APT fix using
its supported update process. This isn't evidence that Ubuntu's repositories or your website have been compromised.
Canonical's update guidance.
October catch-ups: still worth resolving
Synology backup devices, warning published 29 October. Synology confirmed ransomware
attacks on outdated DSM systems. If your business uses a Synology NAS for files or backups, ask your IT provider to
install the latest compatible DSM security updates, review internet access to its management interface, and test a
separate backup that the device's credentials cannot overwrite. This is an October catch-up, not a new attack disclosed
today. Synology's warning · September security updates.
PHP, 21 and 23 October. The PHP2Shell fixes shipped in 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27 and
8.5.12. Ask your host to verify the runtime or vendor backport. PHP's separate 23 October note covers a different
issue, CVE-2026-115560: an unusual combination of session configuration and application code that the 21 October releases
don't fix. Its interim advice is to switch session upload progress off until the full advisory ships; if your host
applied that mitigation on 21 October, keep it in place. Windows hosts should also check the 26 October package rebuild.
PHP's advisories.
LiteLLM, 21 October. The vendor's scope: the PyPI package litellm 1.107.0 and the
container tags v1.107.0, latest, main-latest and main-stable, for roughly two hours on 21 October. Its enterprise
private registry wasn't affected, and the GitHub 1.107.0 source tag is clean. If your provider ever started that version,
the vendor says to treat the environment as compromised and rotate everything it could reach — and not to run Python
in it to check, because the malware reloads on startup. This isn't evidence that an ordinary business website is affected.
Vendor incident report · Corrected investigation, 23 October.
Being patched today doesn't prove you weren't exposed yesterday. It also doesn't prove there was a compromise.
Those questions need different evidence.
Three questions for your website provider
1. Are we running affected software?
Ask for WordPress core (if used), plugins, themes, PHP, hosting security and remote-management tools to be
checked. Are they supported and patched? Which administration services are publicly reachable, and do they
need to be? Somebody should know what's running underneath your website.
2. Were we exposed before it was patched?
What evidence exists of exploitation or compromise? Have relevant logs and alerts been reviewed? What can't be
established from the records available? If credentials were exposed, which passwords, keys and sessions need
replacing or revoking? A clean update alone may not remove an attacker's access.
3. Who is responsible if something goes wrong?
Who manages hosting, backups, security updates and incident response? When was a backup last successfully
restored, and is a recoverable copy kept separately from the live site? Use multi-factor authentication for
email, hosting and administrator accounts. Can you reach the responsible person when it matters?
Send this to your provider
Hi, could you help me check our website security? Could you confirm our WordPress core (if used), plugins, themes and PHP runtime are on supported, patched releases, including PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619)? Does our hosting use cPGuard or remote-management software affected by a recent incident? Please confirm whether we were exposed before patching, what logs were checked, whether affected passwords, keys or sessions need replacing, and when a backup was last successfully restored. Who owns each action? A short written update, including anything you cannot establish, would be appreciated. Thanks.
You can also select the message above and copy it into an email. No registration needed.
10 local businesses. Free exposure checks.
The first ten eligible businesses receive a personally reviewed initial website exposure assessment, with a short written report in plain English.
Publicly observable website and hosting characteristics.
Relevant recent advisories and potential exposure.
Questions only your hosting provider can resolve with evidence.
Prioritised next actions to take back to your developer or provider.
Genuinely free. No obligation. No purchase required.
This is an initial external review, not a full penetration test, forensic investigation, compliance certification
or guarantee of security. No exploit attempts or intrusive testing are included.
Who it's for
Businesses in the Huon Valley and southern Tasmania with a public website. Sole traders, family businesses and
small not-for-profits are welcome. I'll confirm local eligibility and your authority to represent the website by
email. No website yet? The local services page is a better starting point.
Eligible places are allocated in the order enquiries arrive, after review. Duplicate enquiries don't get extra
places. I'll confirm an award in writing; submitting an enquiry doesn't secure one. The ten-place limit includes
completed assessments.
Example Orchard · example.invalid Example assessment date: 25 October 2026
Observed
Public site served over HTTPS. Underlying PHP runtime version not externally verifiable. Hosting ownership
not yet confirmed.
Potential concern
PHP2Shell exposure cannot be ruled in or out from public observations.
Next action
Ask the hosting provider to confirm the PHP runtime, patch status and relevant log review.
Confidence and outcome
Limited by external-only access. Provider verification required; no conclusion of compromise.
An unanswered question is not a confirmed vulnerability. A lack of visible problems is not a security certificate.
Request a free check
Email me using the draft below. Include your business name, public website URL, town or suburb, contact name
and email, and confirmation that you own or are authorised to represent the website. A short concern is
optional.
Please don't send passwords, API keys, hosting credentials, customer records, payment details or sensitive
files.
This opens your email app. You still need to complete and send the email. Nothing has been submitted by
clicking. If it doesn't open, email
adrian@adrianwedd.com
with the subject “ON FIRE — free website exposure review”.
Show the application text to copy
Hi Adrian,
I'd like to request the free initial website exposure review.
Business name:
Public website URL:
Business location (town/suburb):
Contact name:
Contact email:
Optional concern (no sensitive details):
Authority: [Please confirm: I own or am authorised to represent this website.]
I understand this is an enquiry, not an awarded place, and that the review is external and non-invasive.
I'll reply to confirm receipt and check eligibility. A place is awarded only when I confirm that separately
in writing. If you haven't heard back within three business days, follow up by email. Please keep any
follow-up in the same thread.
Enquiry information is used to check eligibility, allocate places and deliver the review. It is held in my
Google-hosted email account and a private local campaign record, accessible to me and the providers operating that
infrastructure. Participant identities and findings aren't published or added to marketing lists. Campaign records
and assessment correspondence are scheduled for deletion 90 days after the offer closes, unless you ask me to
retain them or a legal requirement applies; provider backups may take longer to expire. Privacy details and deletion requests.
I'm Adrian. I'm in Cygnet.
I build and investigate software systems, from local business tools to adversarial testing of AI. My work spans
cybersecurity, reliability and finding out what systems actually do when things go wrong. This is me offering a
bounded piece of useful work to my neighbours.
— named CVE-2026-115560 and its interim advice in the PHP note,
and recorded LiteLLM's affected artifacts and remediation scope from the vendor's incident report. No new incident.
Offer unchanged.
— added a conditional Ninja Forms File Uploads add-on check, with
the original 11 November disclosure date and fixed version. Offer unchanged.
— added a targeted Apache HTTP/2 hosting check and the 2.4.71
security release, separate from older hosting catch-ups. Offer unchanged.
— added a targeted Outlook-on-Windows security-update check following
Microsoft's disclosure and CISA's 10 November UTC exploitation listing. Offer unchanged.
— added CISA's 9 November known-exploitation listing for the existing
Alpine/OpenSSH advisory. Fix guidance and offer unchanged.
— added a targeted LatePoint booking-plugin update and customer-account
check, with disclosure and fix dates distinguished. Offer unchanged.
— added dated Linux-kernel and Ubuntu APT hosting catch-ups, including
checks that security updates are actually in effect. Offer unchanged.
— added the Alpine/OpenSSH remote-login check and clarified protection
during the first WordPress full-package security update. Offer unchanged.
— added a Microsoft 365 trusted-application check and the 29 October
Synology ransomware warning as a historical catch-up. Offer unchanged.
— added cPGuard and the WordPress exploitation listing; separated
October catch-ups; expanded provider checks for core updates, management tools, credentials and tested recovery. Ten-place
offer unchanged.
— first published: PHP and LiteLLM advice, local offer and example
report.
Advisories can change. Internet Fire Watch informs the daily editorial review; we publish when evidence or useful
advice changes. A quiet day does not trigger a new timestamp. Incident dates above are separate from this page's
review date. The later LiteLLM investigation corrects parts of its initial explanation. Spotted something
outdated? Email a correction.
This site uses cookies for analytics (Google Analytics), advertising (Google AdSense, LinkedIn Insight), and
personalisation (visit count, stored locally). No tracking before consent. Full privacy details
Analytics: Google Analytics 4 tracks aggregate traffic—what gets read, where readers
come from. No individual session reconstruction.
Advertising: Loads Google AdSense and the LinkedIn Insight Tag—both set third-party
cookies used for ads and ad measurement.
Personalisation: Visit counter stored in your browser's localStorage. Never
leaves your device.
Keyboard shortcuts
Navigation
g hHomeg bBlogg pProjectsg gGalleryg nNowg aAboutg vActivity