Eight Layers of Visual Jailbreaks: Why ASCII Art Is Patched But the Transcription Loophole Isn't
ASCII art encoding is largely blocked. But attacks framed as content transcription succeed 62–75% of the time. We mapped all eight layers.
40 posts
ASCII art encoding is largely blocked. But attacks framed as content transcription succeed 62–75% of the time. We mapped all eight layers.
Fifteen specialist AI agents, one methodology. How adversarial AI evaluation scales through Claude Code sessions with distinct roles and standing instructions.
Five models, four providers, 30B to 671B parameters — all converge at the same broad attack success rate against a public jailbreak corpus.
A reasoning model refused every harmful prompt — but its chain-of-thought generated the content anyway. The output filter worked. The thinking did not.
Reasoning models autonomously jailbreak other AI systems at 97% success. The implication: ecosystem safety degrades as individual models improve.
Frontier reasoning models are 5–20x more vulnerable to adversarial prompts than non-reasoning models. The thinking process itself is the attack surface.
Reformulating harmful prompts as poetry bypasses safety filters across every major LLM family. A single-turn, universal jailbreak mechanism.
90% of companies plan to increase AI investment. 1% consider themselves AI-mature. The J-Curve explains why — and how to survive the trough.
75% of lawyers cite accuracy as their top AI concern. The legal profession's core values are in direct tension with current AI capabilities.
Why do large organisations fail when the warning signs are loud and unambiguous? Four mechanisms of structural scar tissue that make truth-telling expensive.
120 models, 18k prompts, 5 attack families. The raw compliance numbers — and why calling them "attack success" needs a demonstrated refusal floor.
Four major forecasters publish wildly divergent numbers for AI's economic impact. The divergence is the analysis — what the spread tells us.